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The Changing Legal Climate for Physician Aid
in Dying
an advance directive statute in California,5 courts and legislatures concluded that patients may reject their physicians’ treatment recommendations even when treatment is necessary to prolong life.
Recognition of the right to refuse life-sustaining care
reflected a societal consensus that people should be able
to decline treatment when they are suffering greatly
from irreversible and severe illness. In such cases, the
burdens of continued treatment may easily outweigh the
benefits, and people should not be forced to endure a
prolonged and undignified dying process.6 What is critical about the right is the desire to protect seriously ill
people from intolerable suffering.
How is it possible to decide when someone’s illness is serious enough that treatment can be refused?
The Quinlan case concluded that the right to refuse lifesustaining treatment should exist when the patient’s
prognosis becomes very grim.4
However, this approach raises serious problems. If
judges must decide when a patient is so sick that the patient can refuse life-sustaining treatment, then the government ends up deciding who must live and who may
die based on judgments about a person’s quality of life.
This approach would possibly lead to “death panels.” Accordingly, later courts concluded that decisions whether to accept or refuse treatment “must ultimately belong to the one
By restricting aid in dying to competent
whose life is in issue.”7
Although it is possible that someone
and terminally ill adults, the law can
will refuse life-sustaining treatment in the
ease the dying process for patients, and
absenceofaseriousillness,thatrarelyhaptheir families, and avoid the potential
pens.Moreover,whensuchrefusalsoccur,
they typically reflect important religious
for the mistreatment of patients.
beliefs, as when a Jehovah’s Witness refusesabloodtransfusion.Inshort,itisposthough patients can suffer greatly from disease before sible to avoid having the government make quality-of-life
their final days, the 5 states have limited recognition of decisions and still be confident that life-sustaining treataid in dying to patients with an incurable condition that ment will be refused by patients only in situations in which
will likely result in death within 6 months2 or within a that option is warranted.
“relatively short time.”3
Although a right to refuse treatment did not go too
This convergence on a right only for terminally ill per- far in allowing death-causing actions, many people felt
sons to aid in dying is no coincidence. Indeed, it reflects it did not go far enough. For instance, some patients are
a long-standing progression in end-of-life law. Society seriously ill and suffering greatly from widely metalimits aid in dying to terminally ill patients to ensure that static cancer or other advanced diseases, but are not dethe practice is available only for individuals whose con- pendent on life-sustaining treatment. For those paditions might justify this option of last resort. The his- tients, aid in dying can be an important option.
tory of end-of-life law is instructive.
However, there are real risks if patients are allowed
At one time, it was not clear whether patients could to receive a prescription for a lethal dose of medicahasten death by refusing life-sustaining medical treat- tion. Not all patients who would ask for a prescription
ment. In the view of many people, turning off a ventila- would be suffering from an irreversible and severe illtor, stopping dialysis, or discontinuing artificial feeding ness. Some might have become tired of life, depressed,
was an act of killing and should be unlawful. But begin- or feel that that their life has insufficient meaning. Acning in 1976 with the Quinlan case in New Jersey4 and cordingly, a right to aid in dying could be recognized only
While once widely rejected as a health care option,
physician aid in dying is receiving increased recognition as a response to the suffering of patients at the
end of life. With aid in dying, a physician writes a prescription for life-ending medication for an eligible
patient. Following the recommendation of the American Public Health Association, the term aid in dying
rather than “assisted suicide” is used to describe the
practice.1 In this Viewpoint, we describe the changing
legal climate for physician aid in dying occurring in
several states (Table).
Voters in Oregon and Washington have legalized aid
in dying by public referendum, legislators in Vermont
have done so by statutory enactment, and courts in Montana and New Mexico have done so by judicial rulings.
Support for aid in dying is increasing, and it would not
be surprising to see voters, legislators, or courts in other
states approve the practice. Indeed, in their 2014 sessions, at least 6 state legislatures considered proposals
similar to the Vermont statute.
Although different states have authorized aid in dying through different legal routes, they all have extended the right to the same class of patients—
mentally competent adults who are terminally ill. Even

jama.com

JAMA May 21, 2014 Volume 311, Number 19

Copyright 2014 American Medical Association. All rights reserved.

Downloaded From: http://jamanetwork.com/ by a University of Nevada - Las Vegas User on 09/27/2017

1961

Opinion Viewpoint

Table. States Currently Legalizing Aid in Dying for Mentally Competent, Terminally Ill Adults
State
Oregon

Year of Legalization
1994 and 1997

Path of Recognition

Eligibility Criteria

Citation for Statute or Court Decision

Public referenda

Mentally competent, terminally
ill adults

Or Rev Stat §§127.800-127.897

Washington

2008

Public referendum

Mentally competent, terminally
ill adults

Rev Code Wash § 70.245

Montana

2009

State supreme court
decision

Mentally competent, terminally
ill adults

Baxter v State of Montana, 224 P3d
1211 (Mont 2009)

Vermont

2013

Legislation

Mentally competent, terminally
ill adults

18 Vt Stat §§5281-5292

New
Mexico

2014

State trial court
decision (subject to
reversal on appeal)

Mentally competent, terminally
ill adults

Morris v Brandenberg, No. D-202-CV
2012-02909 (Bernalillo County, NM,
January 13, 2014)

with assurances that access would be limited to patients who are
truly seriously ill. In addition, as with the withdrawal of treatment,
the government could not impose limits by making quality-of-life
judgments.
The terminal illness requirement provides the right kind of limit
for aid in dying. It does not empower the government to make quality-of-life judgments, and it restricts the practice to patients who are
suffering from irreversible and severe disease.8
This is not just a matter of theory. Oregon has had more than
15 years of experience with aid in dying limited to the terminally ill,
and the state’s experience has been reassuring. Aid in dying is
used rarely by dying patients—less than one-half of 1% of deaths
result from the practice (less than 100 patients annually). Approximately 80% of aid-in-dying patients are terminally ill from cancer,

/advocacy/policy/policysearch/default.htm?id
=1372. Accessed April 11, 2014.
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and aid-in-dying patients are similar to other dying patients in
terms of sex, race, health insurance coverage, and hospice enrollment. Moreover, aid-in-dying patients tend to have higher levels
of education than other dying patients.9 Vulnerable patients are
not succumbing to aid in dying. It is not surprising that once
Oregon’s experience with aid in dying was reassuring, other states
were willing to consider authorizing aid in dying.
Although many critics of aid in dying have been concerned that
legal recognition of the practice would result in a slippery slope to
abuse, those fears have not materialized in Oregon, Washington, or
the other states that have given formal recognition to aid in dying.
By restricting aid in dying to competent and terminally ill adults, the
law can ease the dying process for patients, and their families,10 and
avoid the potential for the mistreatment of patients.
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